The claim is that the batteries were not overcharged, but how do we know this?  Log data from the charge controllers?  Do we know the software was reporting the voltage and SOC correctly?

This needs to be checked out forensically, because after Stuxnet we cannot discount sabotage in anything with loadable software that has come in contact with an Internet-connected development system.

Bad cell - use good cell - backup the backup.

How can they get anything out of that charred mess?

Take the batteries out of there even if it means an extra 60 lbs. of added weight and go fly the friendly skies.

Are these comments coming from the same people that complain that new technology to save weight is ignored by industry?

Ten pounds of batteries is ten pounds of cargo lost, or a substantial fraction of a pound of fuel to haul it on each leg.  These savings add up.

Every system on an airplane is designed for minimum practical weight – because they must fly.

When a problem occurs, someone can always say that the system involved could have been more robust if it were designed 10 pounds heavier – and maybe they do design main battle tanks that way.

But do NOT fly on a passenger airliner; they are all potential time bombs filled with electrical devices and fuel.

After the A300 - Fight 587 out of New York City crashed in Queens on November 12, 2001 killing all 260 people on board and five on the ground, they attributed the crash to overuse of the rudder in response to wake turbulence from a preceding Boeing 747.

Until retired in August 2009, these A300s continued in service with a rudder that was very sensitive (with no force feedback) and a vertical stabilizer that COULD NOT withstand “lock-to-lock” actuation at final segment climb speed.

Despite ten previous recorded incidents with A300 tail fins; the NTSB concluded that the vertical stabilizer's structural performance was consistent with design specifications and had failed because it had been stressed beyond its design limits.

Hard to say, Tex.

Both Boeing and Airbus are trying to retain all of their options.

Unlike the FAA, the NTSB has a reputation for being estranged from practicality and common sense.

The point was if they used a safer battery chemistry resulting in a 5-10 pound increase for a box with the same Wh capacity, the added safety with 5 pounds more considering the 500,000 weight of the plane would be acceptable.

They should buy boeing 777 instead, it's almost the same thing but with less fancy problems.

Except you can use safer battery chemistry, LiFePO4, at the same weight. Because this was an older version of the LiCo chemistry the specific energy density is about the same as today's LiFePO4. Change the operating voltage parameters for the system slightly and stick in a bunch of LiFePO4 cells. Or just have Tesla design the battery since they have experience with LiCo and variants in large packs that don't catch fire. Using newer versions of LiCo Tesla could increase the energy density and safety at the same time.

The problem isn't getting LiFePO4 cells in the right quantity and form factor.  The problem is finding a manufacturer willing to devote enough engineering time to document everything to FAA standards.  I doubt that the 787 market is big enough to be very attractive, and the battery makers already have their best people working on other things.  Taking on a major distraction could mean falling behind in the race against the other battery-makers, and that means serious damage to the company.